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I. Statement of the Case 
1 .  Nature of tlze Case. This is an appeal from a grant ofpartial su~n~nary judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff-Responde~lt in an action for partition of real estate located in Madison County, 
Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code $ 6-501 et. seq., and for an accounting of receipts and 
disburse~nents received by Defendants-Appellants on account of said property. 
2. Ideiztificatioiz ofPnrties. Plaintiff-Respondent, Madison Real Property, LLC, 
(hereafter referred to as "Madison Real Property") is an Idaho limited liability company and is 
the owner of a one-third interest in the real estate which is the subject of this action. Defendants- 
Appellants, Marilynn Thonlason and Byron Thomason, husband and wife, are owners of a one- 
third interest in the real estate which is the subject of tlGs action. Defendants-Appellants, 
Nicl~olas Thomason and Sandra Tho'mason, husband and wife, are owners of aone-tlurd interest 
in the real estate which is the subject of flus action. The appellants will be referred to herein as 
the "Thomasons" unless fewer than all of tliem are being referenced. 
3.  Course of the Proceedings. 
Madison Real Property filed its cornplaint for partition and an accounting on April 4, 
2008. R. Vol. I., p. 6. Marilynn Tllomason and Byron Tho~nason were served the sulnlnons and 
co~l~plaint on April 4, 2008. R. Vol. l., p. 6. Nicholas and Sandra Tl~omason were senled t l ~ e  
s u n u ~ ~ o ~ ~ s  and complaint on April 5, 2008. R. Vol. l., p. 6. Defendants Marilyml Thomson and 
Byron Tl~omason filed their answers to Madison Real pro pert)^'^ complaint on Apiil24,2008. R. 
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Vol. 1 ., p. 6. Defendants Nicholas and Sandra Thomason filed their answers to plaintiff's 
complaint on April 25,2008. R. Vol. I., p. 6. 
Defei~dants Marilynn and Byron Thomason filed a motion to dismiss on May 27,2008, 
which was denied by a11 order of the court on June 16,2008. R. Vol. l., p. 6. 
On July 7,2008 Nicliolas Thornason filed a Notice of service of his First Request for 
Production to Plaintiff R. Vol. I., p. 6. That same date Byron Thomason filed his Notice of 
Service of Defendant Byron T. Thomason's First Request for Adinissions to the Plaintiff. R. Vol. 
1 ., p. 7. On July 31,2008 Madison Real Property filed its Notice of Compliance with Defendant 
Byron T. Tllomason's First and Second Requests for Admission, and its Notice of Cornpliance 
with Defendant Nicholas A. Thomason's First Request for Production. R. Vol. 1 ., p. 7. The 
T11omasons.have not served any other discovery requests at any time. 
On July 11,2008, Madison Real Property filed and served on the Tliomasons its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment in which it aslted the district court to enter judgment on the issue 
of ownership of the subject real estate, incIuding the respective rights of the parties in tile 
property. That the court order a physical partition of the subject property and appointment of 
referees and the I-ight of the plaintiff to receive an accouilting for all receipts and disbursenleilts 
received and made on account of said propnty fi.0111 October 30,2001, or for such other use 
made of the property by defendants. A Notice of Hearing scheduled for August 18, 2008 was 
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filed and served on the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 2', R, Vol. 2., p. 239-240. Madison 
Real Properly also filed and served an Affidavit in support of its lnotion and a Brief in support of 
its motion on July 11,2008. R. Vol. I., pp. 7. No objection, briefs, affidavits or other opposition 
to the motion for suminary judgment was filed by the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 2 and 3. 
On August 15,2008, a motion for contilluance was filed by Byron and Marilynn Thoinason. 
Record of Action, p. 2. R. Vol. 3., pp. 308, 327. The hearing on Madison Real Property's motion 
for partial summary judgment was held on August 18,2008. Record of Action, p. 2. The motion 
for continuance by Byron and Marilynn Thomason was denied, the district court finding that it 
was not timely nor supported by argument. R. Vol. 2., p. 243. On August 22,2008, the district 
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment. R. Voi. 2.', p. 244. On September 8, 2008 the district court entered an Order 
Appointing Referees. R. Vol. 2., p. 265. On September 16, 2008 the district court entered an ' 
Order Awarding Attorneys fees and costs. R. Vol. 2., p. 268. 
Thoinasons filed a Notice ofAppeal on October 1,2008. R. Vol. 3., p. 284. This appeal 
was conditionally dislnissed by the Suprelne Court as untimely on October 16, 2008. On 
November 20,2008, this appeal was finally dismissed. R. Vol. 4., pp. 645, 672, 683. 
On October 6,2008, the Thon~asons filed a Motion for Stay of Judgine~~t, New 
TrialiHearing, to A111end ljil~diilgs and Conclusions, Ame11d Judgi~~ent and All Other Authority. 
'The Register &Action is located in Volume I .  of the Clerk's Record and is not 
paginated. 
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Register of Actions, p. 3. Madison Real Property filed its Reply and Objection to the Thomasons' 
Motions on October 14,2008. Register of Action, p. 3 and R. Vol. 4., p. 634. A hearing was held 
on the Tl-iomasons' various motions on October 20, 2008. Record of Actions, p. 4. The district 
court entered its Order denying Tl~omasons' motions and granting Madison Real Property 
attorney fees on October 20,2008. R. Vol. 4. p. 667. 
Pursuant to its findings in its October 20,2008 Order, the district court issued a Second 
Order Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs on November 14,2008. R. Vol. 2., p. 670. 
On December 23,2008 Byron and Marilynn Tl~ollzason filed their Joint Appeal on Order 
November 14,2008. R. Vol. 4. 684, 697, 698. Nicholas and Sandra did not file a notice of appeal 
but have signed the brief with Byron and Marilym. No other notice of appeal has been filed since 
the filing ofthe December 23,2008 notice of appeal. 
The referees filed their report with the district coufi on December 2, 2008. R. Vol. 4., p. 
623. Madison Real Property filed a Motion for Order Confirming tlle Referees Report and for 
Judginent on December 19,2008. R. Vol. 4., p. 794. A hearing was held oil the motion on April 
27,2009. R. Vol. 4. p. 700. The district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
confizlnillg tlle referees' report on June 12,2009. 
The Tllomasons' tl~en filed tluee liiotions includi~ig (1 .) Defeiidallts' Joint Motion for 
Reconsideration, filed June 26,2009 by B p l l  Tliornason and Marily~m Tl~o~ilason. R Vol. 4, p. 
718; (2.) Defei~dants' Joiner Joint Motion fo1- Reconsideration Fraud Upon the Court, filed July 
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8> 2009 by Nicholas Thomason, Sandra Thomason, Byron Tholnason and Marilynn Thornason. 
R. Vol. 4., p. 734A; and (3.) Joint Objection and Second Motion for. Reconsideration July 15, 
2009 Order, filed July 20,2009 (one such motion from Byron, Marilynn and Nicllolas Thomason 
and an identical one from Sandra Thomason). R. Vol. 4., p. 81 6. Tile district court held a hearing 
on these motions on August 10, 2009. R. Vol. 4., p. 839. The district court entered its Order 
Denying the Thomasons' Motions for Reconsideration on August i 1,2009. R. Vol. 4., p. 846. 
4. Statement of the facts. 
Prior to partition, Madison Real Property was the owner of a one-third undivided interest 
in a 75 acre tract of farm pound located in Madison Couilty, Idaho generally referred to as the 
"Fanlistead" by the parties. R. Vol. I., p. 51-52, Madison Real Property is the successor in 
interest to William Forsberg who received his. one-third undivided interest in the Farmstead by a 
deed from Greg and Diana Thomason recorded October 30,2001 and a correction warranty deed 
recorded March 29,2002. R. Vol. 1 ., pp. 85 and 86. Marilynn and Byroll Tholnason were the 
owners of a one-third undivided interest in the farmstead property. Nicholas and Sandra 
Thomason were the owners of a one-third undivided interest in tile farnlstead property. R. Vol. 
2., p. 166. 
Tile Tl~omasons brougllt suit against Madison Real Propnty's predecessor in interest, 
Willianl Forsbe~g, in the United States Ba~kruptcy Court for tile District of Idaho, seelcing 
anlong other tl~ings, to quiet title to t11e Farnlsteacl Property in Tholnason Fanns, Inc. R. Vol. 1 ., 
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pp. 53, 59, 60, 63, 64. Forsberg answered and counterclaimed denying all of t l~e  Thomasons' 
allegations and requesting that the banlmptcy court quiet title in a one-third undivided interest in 
the Farmstead properly in him. R. Vol. 2., p. 174-180. Following a trial on the merits, in a 
Mernoranduln Decision dated June 9,2006, the Banlmptcy Court found against the Thomasons 
and in favor of the Forsbergs on all claims. In a final judgment dated October 3,2006, the 
banIuuptcy court then quieted title to a one-tl~ird undivided fee simple interest in the Farinstead 
Property in William Forsberg subject to any community interest ofhis spouse. R. FiPrh Affidavit 
of William Forsberg, Exhibit 24, p. 78.' 
The Thomasons appealed the bankruptcy court's decision against them to the Ba~luuptcy 
Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Their appeal was denied and the 
banluuptcy couri'sdecisionupheld in all respects by Judgn1ententered August 7, 2007. R. Fifth 
Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 2 of the Memorandum. No furtl~ex appeal was talten 
from this decision. R. Vol. l., p. 122. 
On September 11,2007, the Thornasons filed a document wit11 the Banlmptcy Court 
entitled "Joint Affidavits of Nicllolas A. Thomason and Byron T. Tl~ornaso~~" which included 
within it an attached doculneirt entitled "Demand for Retrial Fraud U ~ o n  the Court." R. Vol. 1 ., 
pp. 87-106. 
This affidavit and its exhibits were submitted by the Clerk of the District Court will1 the 
Record herein. See R. Vol. 4., second lo the last page (Certificate of Exhibits). 
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On October 26,2007 Byron Thomason filed an Affidavit of Plaintiff, Byron T. 
Tilomason, Fraud On the Court Balzlvuptcy Fraud, Exhibits & Clailns wit11 a supplenlei~t 
consisting of Exhibits A through I and Exhibits I through 3. R. Vol. 3., pp. 361-630. The 
documellt purported to detail, among other things, alleged acts and omissions by William 
Forsberg in concert with Greg and Diana Thomason, the banlcruptcy trustee and other defendants 
which were characterized as fraud, fraud on the court, real estate fraud and crimes, which should 
have voided the conveyance of the Fannstead property. R. Vol. 3., pp. 386,391,395-396. 
A hearing was held on the Thomasons' motion for relief from judgmei~t and for a new 
trial on October 31, 2007. R. Vol. l., p. 117; Vol. 2., p.153. The banlmptcy coui-t entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order 011 November 26,2007 in which it denied the Thomasons' 
motion for relief fro111 tlleprior judgment aild for a new trial. R. Vol. I., pp. 120-136. The court 
further ordered that, to tile extent the Fraud on the Court document filed by the Tl~omasons 
constituted a separate request for relief, it was denied. R. Vol. I., pp. 137-138. No appeal was 
taken fronl the decision of the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2., pp. 209-222. (Ba~dcruptcy Court 
Doclcet Repoli reflects that no notice of appeal was filed following the entiy of the banluuptcy 
court's Menlorandu~n Decisioll and Order Denying Motion for Relief.) The time fol- filing an 
appeal has passed and the Thonlasons did not appeal the bankruptcy court's No~re~nber 26,2007 
order. 
Respondent's Brief Page 7 
On September 26, 2008, Appella~lts Nicholas tho ma so^^ and Sandra Thornason, filed a 
Derna~~d for Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Baillcruptcy in the ballluuptcy court cases. They were 
joined in their de~nand and inotioll later by Marilyim and Byron Thomason. After a hearing on 
December 10, 2008, the Elonorable Jim D. Pappas entered his Order wherein the Demand for 
Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Ba~u'uuptcy was denied. R. Fiftll Affidavit of William Forsberg, 
Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Me~nora~~dum, lines 2-8. The Thomasons' latest motion in b a ~ h p t c y  
court was again based on their allegation of fraud 011 the court. R. Fifth Affidavit of William 
Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Menlorandu~n, lines 9-1 6. 
On December 19,2008, the Tl~omasons filed a notice of appeal of the Ba~dauptcy Court's 
Order denying their motion to dismiss ban lq tcy .  R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, 
Exhibit 25, p. 5 of the Me~norandum, lines 2-4: On December 22,2008, the Thomasons filed 
their Notice of Appeal on the Banlmptcy Court's Order denying their demand for a new t~ial .  R. 
Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 5 of the Memorandum, lines 4-6. III their 
briefs, tlle Thomasons expanded tlleir issues to include tl~eir conte~~tiol~ that tlie banlmptcy court 
deliberately suppressed pre~iiously submitted docume~~ts to assist t l~e trustee in obtaining an 
illegal claim to an asset. Tlle banlvuptcy court judge allegedly did this because a meinber of his 
follner law firm represe~~ted olle of the parties in tlle litigation. R. Fifth Affidavit of Willia~l? 
Forsberg, Exllibit 25, p. 7 of the Memora~~dum, lines 25-28; p. 8, lines 1-3.3 
' 111 rejecting this asgume~~t the appellate court stated, "Eve11 tlloug11 ~neitl~es the AP 
Deinalld nor t l~e Case Demand refers to bias of the judge, and even tl1ougl1 this is not all appeal 
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On June 26, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Balrlmptcy Appellate Panel 
entered its Judp~ent  affirming the Banluuptcy Court's judgment and Order of Deceniber 10, 
2008. R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25 (2nd unnumbered page). The Thomasons 
have since filcd a petition for further review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
petition is now pending. Neither the Farinstead property, nor any of the parties to this action are 
subject to any stay issued by the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2. p. 154. 
The only persons or entities with any ownership claim in the Fannstead are parties to illis 
action. R. Vol. 2. p. 166. The plaintiff requested by letter that the Tholnasons voluntarily 
negotiate a partition of the Farmstead. They refused to do so. R. Vol. I ., pp. 21-22A. The other 
interests include the attorney's lien of Jay ICohler which attaches to the ownersllip interest of the 
Thoinasons and the property tax anearage owed to Madison County. R. Vol. I., p. 18. 
Since 2001, the fannstead has been farmed by Thomason Farms, Inc., and since 2003 it 
has been farmed by Double T Farming and Ranching, Inc. without the lcnowledge or conse~~t of 
Madison Real Prope~ty or its predecessor. R. Vol. 2., p. 154,712. Although Thornason Fa~ms, 
Inc. and Double T. Fanning and Rancl~ing, Inc. have fanned the Farmstead property and received 
the crops therefrom and farm program payments from the federal govenul~e~lt, the property taxes 
of a nlotion for disqualificatioll or recusal ofthe judge, the Appella~~ts request that we reverse on 
these grounds. We will not do so, as these arpneilts have been raised for tlie first time on 
appeal, . . . Moreover, Appellants are requesting us to consider evidence not presented to the 
banlu~ptcy courl in the context of tl~e AP denland and the Case Denland. . . . Rather they have 
appe~lded to their opening brief four docuinents that were not mentioned in the AP Deil~aild or in 
the Case Denland. . . Because the four docuinei~ts appended to the Appellailts' briefs were not 
presented to the bailIwuptcy court in the context of the A? Demand and the Case Deina~d, we 
cannot consider tl~ein in this appeal." (Citations omitted). 
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have not been paid and no accounting of the proceeds from the knling of the Farmstead 
property or the crop proganl payments has ever been made to Madison Real Properly or its 
predecessor. R. Vol. 2., p. 154, '1 3. 
11. Additional Issues Presented on Appeal 
Madison Real Property is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs against the 
Thornasons. 
111. Basis for Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Tl~ere are several statutory bases for an award of attorney fees for this appeal: 
Idaho Code 5 6-545. COSTS OF PARTITION -- APPORTIONMENT TO PARTIES -- 
LIEN. The costs of partition, iizcludirzg reasonable couizsel fees, expended by the plaintiff 
or either of the defendants for the comnon benefit, fees of referees, and other 
disbursements, must be paid by the parties respectively entitled to share in the lands 
divided, in proportion to their respective interests therein, and may be included and 
" 
specifiedin tlle judgment. In that case they shall be a lien on the several shares, and the, 
judgment may be enforced by execution against such shares and against other property 
held by the respective parties. KVzeiz, howevbi: litigation arises between some of the 
parties ooizly, the court may require the expense ofsuch. litigation to bepaid by theparties 
thereto, 07. aizji of them. (Emphasis added.) 
This appeal was brougllt by Byron and Marily~m Tllomason and therefore Madison 
Real Property is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against them as a cost of partition as set 
foltll above. 
Madison Real Propei-ty is entitled to attorney's fees pursuai~t o I.C. $ $  12-120(1) and (3): 
Ida110 Code 5 32-120. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. (1) Except as 
provided in subsections (3) and (4) ofthis section, in any action where the amount pleaded is 
twenty-five tl~ousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allo~ied to t11e pl.n~ailing 
party, as pal? of t l~e  costs of i l~e  action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the coust as atton?eyls 
fees. . . 
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"I.C. 5 12-120(3) . . . allows recovery for attonley fees by the prevailing party in any colnlnercial 
transaction.'' A "con~mercial transaction" is defined as any transaction, except transactions for 
personal household purposes. I.C. 5 12-120(3). 
Madison Real Property's suit against the Thomasons seelcs partition as well as an 
accounting and award of its share of the rents and profits collected by the Thomasons over the 
years they have exercised sole contxol ofthe property. No amount was specified in Madison Real 
Property's pleadings. The Farmstead is an agricultural property and as such is commercial in 
nature. The relationships and disputes between the parties are conlmercial in nature. Madison 
Real Property is entitled to an award of attorney's fees based upon the amount pleaded being less 
that $25,000 and the partition and accounting being conmercial transactions. 
In Peekcen v. Loc1w)ood Eizgineei*iizg, B. T/., 148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150, 1172 (2009) the 
Supreme Court granted attorneys fees on appeal, reaffirming its prior holding$ that "A' 
co~mercial transaction is defined as any transaction, except transactions fox personal household 
purposes." Id., C~i.an~er 11. Slntei: 146 Idaho 868, 881,204 P.3d 508, 521 (2009). It went on to 
hold that an appeal from a judgment on issues arising a dispute over the parties' respective rights 
(3) In any civil action to recover on a11 open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instiument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or 
services nlzd ill. ai~ji conznzercial tmizsnction uizless otherwise provided bji  la^^, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected 
as costs. (En~phasis added.) 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all tra~~sactions except tra~~sactions 
for personal or housel~old purposes. The tell11 "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, tl~e state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof 
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over ter~ninatio~~ of a joint venture, falls under tiledefinition of a "co~nrnercial travlsaction." Here 
the Tho~nasons' appeal is from a dispute over co-tellants rights on partition of commercial 
agsicultural property, includiilg Madison Real Property's right to an accounting and to be paid its 
sl~ilres of the rents and profits from the property. This relatioilship also falls under the clefillition 
of a coinmercial transaction. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 "provides that '[iln any civil action, the judgemay award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing pasty. . . .' Such an award is appropriate wl-~e~l this Court has the 
abiding belief illat the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." BfIA Im~estmerzts, Irzc. 11. State, 138 Ida10 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474,48 1 (2003) (citing 
I.C. 5 12-121). 
IV. Ar, oument 
1. Issues not wroperlv raised in the district court or preserved for appeal sl~ould not be 
considered for the first tivne on aoweal. 
Thomasons have raised a number of issues for the first time in this appeal. In several 
cases, tllese issues also have not been identified with sufficient specificity. Tl~ese issues include: 
A. Failure of t l~e  covlveyance to Madison Real Property because the inst~u~nent of 
conveyance did not include a covllplete address; 
B. Madis011 Real PropeiTy's stallding to bring the case; 
C. The district court allegedly igiloring the appellai~ts' filings and affidavits 
against the respo~ideilt as well as their evidence and argunleilts and objections to responde~~t's 
motion for suil1mar)i judgmei~t; 
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D. Suimnary judgment should not have been granted where discovery was not 
conlplete; 
E. The district court abused its discretion when it granted Madison Real Property 
attorney fees; and, 
F. The district court abused its discretion when it appointed referees. 
As pointed out previously, Marilynn and Byron Thomason filed the notice of appeal. 
Nicllolas and Sandra Thomason did not file a notice of appeal and should not be included herein. 
Michall~ v. Mbclanllc, P.3d -, 2009 WL 3353048 (Idaho 2009), the Supreme 
Court held, "It is well established that a litigant may not remain silellf as to claimed error during 
a trial and later raise objections for the first time on appeal." Id., qziotiizg Bnrnaore v. Bnrnaore, 
145 Idaho 340,343, 179 P.3d 303,306 (2008). "Additionally, substantive issues will not be 
considered for tllefirst time bn appeal. Accordingly, this court will not consider any issue on 
appeal that [the appellant] failed to properly preserve during trial. Because [the appellant] chose 
to relllain silent during tlle entirety of the trial proceedings, this Court can consider vely few, if 
any, of the issues that [tile appellai~t] raises on appeal." hfichalk, at p. 3. 
In Merr"il11~. Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 132 P.3d 449 (2006) this court held "[the appellant] 
has not identified the clainled statutory violation with sufficient specificity to enable us to 
address it, and even if such specificity were prese~lted, it appears that the issue was uot preselved 
for appeal by presentation to the trial court." Furfiler, that "[appellant] has not raised a single 
issue on appeal that could be considered 'fairly debatable."'h4errill, 142 Idallo ai 697, 132 P.3d 
at 454. See nlso I E B  Erzteiprises, L.P. v. Snzedlgi, 140 Ida110 746,754, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (2004) 
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(issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal); Nelson 11. Arzclersoi? Lunzber Co., 140 
Idaho 702,712,99 P.3d 1092, 1102 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Althougl~ each of these issues will be discussed hereil~ separately, tl~is court should not 
consider any of these issues in this appeal because they were llot raised before the district court at 
the appropriate times and preserved for appeal below. 
2. The district court has subiect matter iurisdictio~l over this case. 
The Thomasons argue that the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case. They base tl~eir argument 011 two things (1) their allegation that a deed conveying the 
Farmstead to Madison Real Property did not have a cornplete address; and (2) their allegation 
that the conveyance of title from Greg and Diana Tllomason to William Forsberg was a 
fraudulent conveyance and therefore void. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a ltey requirement for the justiciability of a claim and camlot 
be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra L(j% Ins. Co. v. G~aizata, 99 Idaho 624, 626, 586 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (1 978). Because of the serious ramifications of a court acting without subject matter 
jurisdiction, namely that the judgme~~ts of that court are void, the concept must h e  clearly 
defined. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction was first defined in Richardsoz 7,. Rudd,, a case dda~ing 
with the predecessor to Idaho Code section 6-501, the statute in issue here: 
Jurisdiction over the subject mattel- is the right ofthe court to exercise judicial power over 
that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the absbacl power to try a 
case of t l~e  ltind or character of the one pending; and not wlletller the particular case is 
one that prese~lts a cause of action, or under the pa:-ticulal. facts is Uiable before the court 
in which it is peilding, 'because of sonle of the iid~erent facts that exist a11d may be 
developed during trial. 15 Idaho 488,494-95,98 P. 842,844 (1908). 
Respondent's Brief Page14 
The Supreme Court has adopted a presumptiol~ that courts of general jurisdictioil have 
subject matter jurisdictioli ullless a party can show otllerwise. Borah 11. McCnndless, 147 Ida110 
73,78,205 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2009). 
The district cou1-t in this case had jurisdiction because it is a court of general jurisdiction 
and these has been 1x0 showing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacltiiig. First, Idaho's 
Constitution provides that "[tlhe district court shall have original jurisdictioll in all cases, both at 
law and in equity." Idaho Const. Art. 5, $ 20. Second, the relevant statutes, all part of Idaho 
Code, title 6, chapter 5, entitled "Partition of Real Estate" provide for jurisdiction over both the 
class of cases presented and over the specific remedy sought. The lawsuit was filed pursuant lo 
Idaho Code section 6-501, which reads: 
Wi~en partition mag be had. Wlien several cotenants hold and are in possession of real 
property as parceners, joint tenants or tenants in comnlon, in which one (1) or more of 
them have ail estate of inherita~~ce, or for life or lives, or for years, an action may be 
brought by one (1) or more of sucli persons for a partitio~l thereof, according to the 
respective rights of the persons interested therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part 
thereof, if it appears that a partition cannot be made witl~out great prejudice to the owners. 
The statutory and co~~stitutional provisions, when talcen together, demonstrate that the 
district court, as a court of general jurisdiction, had the authority to hear this matter wl~en filed 
because it was in fact dealing with the partition of real property under the authority granted by 
Ida110 Code section 6-501. 
3. Madison Real P1.ove1-t~ has standin2 to brine this case. 
Tliolilasons, for the first time, arbxe in their brief that Madison Real Property did not have 
standing to bring this action. Standing is a subcatego~-y 0.f justiciability and is "a prelinlinary 
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question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case." Trozltizer v. 
I<ei7zptlzome, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). Although not fully al-ticulated in 
their brief, the basis oftheir argument appears to be that Madison Real Property, LLC has no 
interest in the Fannstead property because a deed to Madison Real Property did not have a 
"complete address."' They further argue that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring 
Idaho Code $ 55-601. This issue was not raised until the Thomasons filed their brief in this 
appeal. 
The evidence in the record is to the contrary. The address on the deed in question is 
Madison Real Property, LLC, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. R. Vol. 2, p. 162, 163. The deed had a 
conlplete and correct legal description, named Madison Real Property as the grantee at the above 
address, and was recorded by the Madison County Recorder. First American Title Cornpany 
issued a litigation guarantee which was in evidenlce before the court at the lime it ruled on the 
partial suinmary jud-went motion in which First America11 examined the state of title and issued 
its finding that fee simple "title to the estate or interest in the [Fannstead property] was vested in 
Madison Real Property, LLC and Byron Thomason, also shown as Byron T. Thomason, and 
Nicholas Thornason . . . each as to a11 undivided one-third interest." R. Vol. 2. p. 166. Idalio law 
recoglizes that the illfor~natioion provided in a title report is prir7zn fncin evidence of a 
5 Idalio Code $ 55-601 provides that "[a] conveyance of an estate in real property may be 
nlade by an instrunlent ill writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent 
thereunto autllorized by writing. The na~ne of the galltee and his co~nl>lete rnailiilg address nlust 
appear on such instrunt eiit." 
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conveyance.~u~ther, the Tlionlaso~~s provide no cite to the record to support their allegation that 
the address was not complete and this court is not required to scour the record for ally sucll 
support. U.S. 1). Rewnld, 889 F.2d 836, 853 n.7 (9"' Cir. 1989). 
Wilere there was no evidence or arpnle~~t .  that tlie deed did not contain a complete 
address before the district court at tile time it rendered its decision, it was correct in finding that 
Madison Real Property was an owner of a fee interest in the Farmstead property. In spite of the 
fact that the Thomasons filed a lnotion to dismiss for, among other reasons, lack of jurisdiction, 
they did not argue that Madison Real Property lacked standing and they did not present any 
evide~lce or argument that the address on the deed collveying the Farmstead property to Madison 
Real Property was not a "complete address." The evidence before the district court was 
unco~~tradicted that Madison Real Property was a fee owner of the Farmstead property and the 
evidence before the district court supported its findiilg and conclusion in its Filldings of Fact,, 
Conclusiol~s of Law and Order Granting Partial Sumnary Iudgnent that ". . . plaintiff, 
[Madison] Real Property, LLC is a tenant in common wit11 a one-third undivided fee simple 
interest in t l~e  Farmstead property with the defenda~~ts Thomasons." R. Vol. 2., p. 250,251. 
Tlle Thomasons' failure to raise the issue of a collveyance before the district court 
forecloses this Court from considering it in this appeal. Michallc, supra; Mevill, supra. 
54-1 02. Certificate of abstracter -- Effect. When ally abstracter is certified, . . . [it] shall 
entitle sucll . . . title report to real estate, certified to or countersigtled and issued by such 
al~stracter, to be received in all courts as piinla facie e~iideilce of the existence of the record of 
deeds, inortgages and otl~es ir~stru~nei~ts, conveyances, or liens, affecting the real estate 
me~~tioned in sucl? . . . title report, and that sucll record is as described in said . . . title report. 
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Idaho case law recobmizes that an address containing sufficient illfonllation to identify 
and locate an addressee is a "complete address" for purposes of conveying seal estate, In Adaiizs 
v. Alzderson, 142 Idaho 208,210-211,127 P.3d 111, 113-114 (2005), the SupremeCourtheld 
that a Record of Survey containing the name of the grantee, although the record "does not state 
outright that Oberbillig is the grantee, a glance at the survey shows he is receiving part of Myers 
property, inalting him the grantee. Finally, altllough Oberbillig's address is not shown, the lot, 
block, street, county, and city are all shown on the Record of Survey. . . Given the a~nount of 
detail provided in the Record of Survey, it would not be difficult to ascertain Oberbillig's street 
address." See also City ofKellogg 12. Mission Mountairz Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16 
P.3d 915 (2000) (a conveyance agreement providing only the name ofthe city contained a 
sufficient address since the City of Kellogg is a well-lcnown municipality in Idaho). 
In ICeb Eizterprises, L.P. 7;. S~izedley, 140 Idaho 746, 101 P.3d 690 (2004), the supreme 
Court held that an address on a quitclaim deed collsisting of "Cannen, Le~nhi County, Idaho" 
was sufficie~~t to comply with Idaho Code 8 55-601. The district court held tl-rat even though the 
grantee ]nay have had a post office box, because Carmen, Idaho, was sparsely populated, the 
address consisting onIy of the town and county was sufficient. 
The address on the deed before the district coud was sufficient to be a complete address 
under the standards the Supreme Caul? has applied in similar cases. 
The Thomasons are also asltiilg the Court to consider evidence not presented to the 
district court and not a part of the record. They have included tluee'exl~ibits in the Appellants' 
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Joint Appendix that were not presented to the district court or mentioned by the Tlion~asons as a 
part of their pleadings and lnemoranda to the district court.7 These exhibits should n0.t be 
considered in this appeal. Oynmu v. Slzeelznn (In re Slzeelznn), 253 F.3d 507, 512 n.5 (9"' Cir. 
2001) ("Evidence that was not before the lower court will not generally be considered on 
appeal"). As noted inifii.sclzrzer v. Uiziden Cor.p. qfAm., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (9"' Cir. 198S), 
"We are here concerned only with tile record before the trial judge ~lhe71 his decision was nzade." 
Ifii.schner, 842 F.2d at 1077, quotiizg Uizited States 11. Wallcer, 601 F.2d 105 1, 1055 (9"' Cis. 
1979) (Afiidavits that "were not part of the evidence presented" to the trial court would not be 
considered on appeal.) (emphasis in ICirsclz7zer). In deciding whetller the district court abused its 
discretion in granting partial sununa~y judgment, this Court should consider only the record 
before tl~e district cou~f when the decision was made. 
4. Tile district court did not abuse its discretion bv finding that the ririous issues decided 
bv tile bankcmatcv court in arevious litigation involving these ~art ies were res iudicata. 
Tl~o~nasons argue the district court abused its discretion by failing to find that various 
issues previously litigated in two adversarp actions in the banlmptcy court were contested 
material issues of fact upon which the district court should have denied granting summary 
judgnent.. The substance of the pre~~iously decided issues raised again in Thomasons' brief is as 
follows: 
7 Exhibits B, C and D of Appellants' Joint Alq~endix are not found in the record, altllougl~ 
pages B. 1-4 appear to be copies of similar deeds that can be found in the record witl~out 
ce~tification data that appears to have bee11 added October 13,2009, after tl~e record was filed 
wit11 tile Suprenle Court. 
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A. The district court failed "sun spoizte" to review and consider all levels of 
jurisdiction. (Citing a letter and a nleinorandum of a verbal agreement betweell Charles, Doralee, 
Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thoinason in Decenlber 1984, which the Tholnasons assert is an 
encu~nbrance on the Farmstead or a trust.) Appellants' Brief, pp. 16 and 17. That Madison Real 
Property has no greater right than the grantor William Forsberg has when he took title to the 
Fannstead with actual Icnowledge that there was a trust. Appellants' Brief, p. 17. 
( I )  The district court did not abuse its disci-elion by failing toJirzd that the 
Farnzstead proper@ was encunzbered by a trust where the issue had been previouslp litigated to 
aJinal judgment. 
The Thomasons now claim it was error that the district court did not undo the final 
judgment of the ba~lluuptcy court because they now wani to claim the property belongs to a trust. 
In an earlier pleading in this case, the Thomasons quote the following language from the 
"trust" in support of their coi~tentions: 
"above property will remain in the direct and equal ownership of Byron, Nicholas, and 
Greg Tl~omason, as long as Byron, Nicholas, andlor Greg Tllolnason continue .to fann. In 
the event of their (Byron, Nicliolas or Greg) death or voluntary leaving the farm 
operation, their individual payout will not exceed the $20,000 . . . and all rights and 
clainls are callcelled for above said property. " R. Vol. 4., p. 745. 
It t u ~ ~ i s  out the Tl~onlasons also made i~lucli of the "trust" docunents in the ba111mptcy 
coul? adversa~y action where title was quieted ill Willia~n Forsberg. Not coincidel~tally, the 
ba~luulptcy court quoted the sarile language the Thomasons now argue the district court abused 
its discretion by not filidil~g to be a inaterial issue of fact, and held as follows: 
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"Plaii~tiffs Byron, Marilylul, Nicholas and Sandra argue that Greg and Diana did not have 
the ability to transfer their interest in the propeity to Mr. Forsberg in 2001 and 2002 because of 
tile tenns of an earlier written lneinoral~dum of agreement executed by Charles, Doralee, Byron, 
Nicholas and Greg on August 25, 1991. Ex. I.  According to Plaintiffs, that memorandu~n was 
executed to document a verbal agreeniei~t entered into by the family meinhers in Deceinbe~ 
1984." The written agseement provides in pa~t :  
This memorandum is to acknowledge a verbal agreement entered into between Charles 
andDoralee Thomason and their now surviving sons, Byron, Nicholas, and Greg 
Thoinason in December 1984. [sic] In which it was agreed that Charles and Doralee 
would transfer the following properties . . . [Teton Pastures and Framstead] and cattle to 
Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thomason. The house and homestead property . . .is to be 
transferred [sic] solely to Byron Thomason. . . . The above vro~ertv will remain in the 
direct and eciual ownership of Bvron. Nicholas. and Greg Thomason. as long as Bvron, 
Nicholas. aildlor Greg Thomason continue to farm. In the event of their (Byron, Nicholas 
or Greg) death or voluntary leaving the farm operation, their individual payout will not 
exceed the $20,000 . . . and all rights and claims are cancelled for above said property. 
Ex. 1 (emphasis added). 
The memorandum also provides that "Charles and Doralee could reside in their home as long as 
either should live, and that after the deaths of both Charles and Doralee, the sons would establish 
a &&$ to benefit Roger's two daugl~ters."~ Emphasis added, R. Fiftli Affidavit of William 
Forsberg, Exhibit 24, p. 54-55 
The court goes on to a~ialyze the doculneniand its effect on Greg and Diana Tiionlasons' 
ability to coiivey the property and concludes: 
'11 should be noted, although the baidwuptcy court did not specifically address the corpus 
of the trust in its opinion, the iilemoralldu~n of agseeine~lt called for the trust to be composed of 
$20,000.00 cash and that the annual interest fiom the trust is to be paid to Roger's children. R. 
Vol. l. ,  p. 83. 
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The deed given by Greg and Diana Tl~omason to Mr. Forsberg colistituted a valid 
conveyance of an undivided one-third interest in the Farmstead Property. The 
lnemoraiidum of agreement did not restrict that transfer or interest. Mernoralldu~n of 
Decision, p. 59, Tlzomasoii. Fn~i~zs, Iiac. v. G ~ e g  Thomason, Dinizn Thonzason, et. al. Case 
No. 04-6134, entered June 9,2006, consisting of 79 pages, reproduced in its entirety in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit, Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 24 (submitted by the 
Clerk of the District Court with tile Record herein). 
It is clear that the document f l~e Tl~omasons are now attempting to characterize as a t~us t  
which does not allow tlie conveyance of the property was in fact considerecl and thorouglily 
litigated in the adversary proceeding in the banlaptcy court, and the court found against the 
Thomasons on this issue. As was held by the coud in its decision granting partial sunuilary 
judgment herein, the doctrine of re.7 judicatn bars the Tho~nasons from attempting to relitigate 
this issue by attempting to characterize it as something it is not. JVnt1n';zs 11. Peacoclc, 145 Idaho 
704, 184 P.3d 210 (2008). 
Tlie second setof issues raised again in the Thomaso~ls' bnef, wl~icli ssues were also 
previously decided are: 
B. Allegations that amount to an assertion that title to llle Farmstead property passed 
fraudulently, including that Greg and Diana Tho~nasoii were insolvent at the time they transferred 
their interest in the Fanlistead property to William Forsberg, Appellants' Brief, p. 19. That 
various types of fraud, batkuptcy fraud, fraud up011 the bankruptcy court were perpetrated by 
Williarn Forsberg and the other paities opposing tlle Thomasolls in tlie ba~iluuptcy court 
litigation, and that Greg and Diana Thomason fraudulently transfe~xd the Fannslead propel?)i to 
Willia~il Forsberg. Appellants' Brief, p. 18 
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( I j  The district court did rzoi en. bji,fiizdiizg that vnriotts nllegntio7zs cffiflttd, 
finudtlleizt trnizsfer nizd,finud zrpoiz the cottrl were rcs judicntn. 
The Tlionlasons did not pursue tlie issue d fraudulent transfer in the original trial in the 
adversary action even tl~ougli the allegations of fraud were a part of their co~nplaint and all ofthe 
allegations they now rnalte would have necessarily been lmown to then? at the time. R. Vol. 1 ., 
pp. 60-65. 
Tile Tlio~nasons' allegations that the conveyance of the property in question was 
fraudulent were also raised and decided in a Rule 60(b) motion they filed in the b a ~ h p t c y  court 
after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Banluuptcy Appellate Panel denied their appeal of the 
ba~dmptcy court's original judgment. Tile Thomasons raised every issue they are alleging in 
their current appeal regarding what they have referred to as the "Unified Fraudulent Transfer 
Act," and "Fraud Upon the Court," in their "Denland for Retrial Fraud Uoon the Court." R. Vol. 
I., pp. 94-1 18; attached lo the "Joint Affidavits of Nicholas A. Tho~nason and Byron T. 
Thomason," R. Vol. I., pp. 87-1 19; and "Affidavit of Plaintiff Byron T. Thomason, Fraud on the 
Court, Bankruptcy Fraud, Exhibits and Claims," R. Vol. 4. pp. 361-630. Following a hearing in 
wllich evidence, ilicludillg testimony, was received, the banlciuptcy court ruled against the 
Tholnasolis on all is~ues.~See R. Vol. 1 ., pp. 120-136 (Memora~~dm~l of Decision and Order 
111 a footnote to its me~nora~iduni decision tlie ba~duuptcy court had this to say regarding 
tlle Thomasons claims, "A postscript is needed here. ~Tliomasons] have sliown tliey lack 
discretion in the inalmer in which they allege others are guilty of serious wrongdoing. From their 
submission, one migl-it conclude tliey lack any coilscie~~ce about the scope and reach of their 
potentially hurlhl, largely baseless, allegations aimed at otliers. In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel, at 
least, is guilty of a laclc o f j u d g i ~ e ~ ~ t  iin enabling his clients, witliout his prior input or review, to 
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entered November 26,2007). The Banlcruptcy Coult's decision regarding ownership of the 
subject property and all issues regarding the Thomasons allegations of fraud is final and not 
subject to further appeal. R. Vol. 2., pp. 209-222 (portion of docket &om the bankruptcy court 
adversary case reflecting that no notice of appeal was filed after the court's decision on 
November 26,2007). All of the allegations contained in Thomasons' appeal in this case were 
decided against them in the adversary case in the bankruptcy court or in their n~otion for relief 
froin judgment. Sea footnote 5, on p. 17, to the Menlorandum Decision of the Ba~dmptcy Court 
on Thomasons' Motion for Relief from Judgment and for a New Trial, Exhibit B to the Affidavit 
of William Forsberg. 
The matter of the conveyance of Greg and Diana Tholnasons' interest in the Fannstead 
property to William Forsberg, subject to his wife's comnunity interest and their title in tlie same 
is resjudicata and not subject to relitigation in this court. See M/ntlcins v. Peacocic, 145 Idaho 704, 
707,184 P.3d 210,213 (2008). 
Res judicata is comprised of true res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel 
(issue preclusion). Hi7zdi1zai.sh 1). Mocic, I38 Idaho 92,94,57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Whether 
claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation 
file docunlents purporting to be affidavits on his letterhead with the Court. Those pleadings were 
not effective nor persuasive. Instead, in thein, the individual Plaintiffs lob scurr-ilous clainls at the 
parties, the trustee, opposing counsel, and on occasio~~, the Court. Plaintiffs and their attorney 
risk inlposition of attorney fees, costs and perhaps eve11 more severe sai~ctions when they talce 
this approach to litigation. The Court adn~onishes then1 to seeain &on1 sucl~ activities in the 
future." R. Vol. 1 ., p. 136 (footnote 5). 
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between the same parties is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Lohman v. F(y~zrz, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). 
Ida110 uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion. U.S. Bnnlc Nntl. Assrz. 11. ICzleizzli, 
134 Idaho 222,226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000). "The doctri~ie of claim preclusion bars not oilly 
subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any 
claims relatillg to the sane cause of action which were actually made or whicli might have been 
made." Hiizd77zarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805. Claim preclusion has thee elements: (1) 
same parties or their privies; (2) sane claim; and (3) final judgmel~t. Ticor Title Co. v. Starzion, 
144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). 
Here, Tl~omasons' claims are barred by claim preclusion. First, as the Forsbergs' 
successor in interest, Madison Real Property is their privy. See id. Second, the issue in Thonznsoiz 
Farnn, 17%~. v. G i q  Thonznsorz, Diaiza Thonznsoiz, et. nl. was the conveyance of Greg and Diana 
Thomasons' interest in the Fannstead property to William Forsberg -- the same issue the 
Thomasons allege was error for the district court not to consider as a contested inaterial fact. 
Third, tile b a ~ h p t c y  court deter~lli~led that the Farmstead property had been validly conveyed 
and quieted title in t l~e Forsbergs, and the Banluuptcy Appellate Panel affinned the judgment of 
the banlmptcy court. There was a final judgment on the merits in Tizonzason Fnnlzs, Inc, 1). Greg 
Thonza.son, Diaiza Tlzonzaso~z, et. nl. Therefore, the doctrine of claim preclusion applies here to 
bar the consideratio~i of Tilomasons' claims regarding the validity of the title. 
Each of the above issues were raised and decided agaiust tile Thomasons by final 
judgn~ents in an adversary action in the banlcruptcy court in wl~icl~ the issue of the ownership of 
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the Farnlstead was tried to a verdict." In that action, the Thomasons initially claimed the 
Farmstead belonged to a corporation, Thomason Farms, Inc, and later in tl~at case claimed the 
Farinstead had to remain in the ownership of Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thomason because of the 
memorandum of agreement they now claim as a trust. All of whicll claims were rejected when 
the court quieted title in Miilliam Forsberg. 
5. Tile district court did not abuse its discretion when it manted partial summan! 
judmnent in favor of Madison Real Propertv where the Thomasons did not raise an\> tilnely 
obiection to the mant of ~oartial summary iudmnent. 
The Thomasons argue that the district court abused its discretion in granting partial 
sum111ar-y judgment by "igno~oring the appellants' iili~lgs and affidavits against the respondent, as 
well as, the evide~lce by the appellants, their arguments and objectiolls to the responde~~t's 
motion for summa& judgment." Appellants' Joint Brief, p.34. Thomasons furtller argue that 
summary judgme~lt should not have been granted where discovery was not complete. Appellants' 
Joint Brief, p. 29. Neither of these issues were raised in district couft, 
h~itially, it is clear from an examiilation of the record that it is devoid of any evidence that 
the Thomasons objected to tile entry of su~mnary judgment, argued agai~lst swmna~y judgment, 
provided any evide~lce in opposition to suimnary judgme~~t, or requested additional time to 
complete discovery. IRCP Rule 56(c) states: "If the adverse party desires to serve opposing 
'' R. Fif11 Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhi17it 24 Meinoratldum of Decision, 
Thonzasori. Fnrr~zs, Ihc. 1). Greg !,oii.or~znsoiz, Dinrzn Ti?onznson, el. nZ. Case No. 04-6134, e~ltered 
June 9, 2006, consisting of79 pages. 
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affidavits the paity must do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. Tile adverse party 
shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date ofthe hearing." Tile 
Thomasons did not to file any affidavits or an answering brief, "Pro se litigants are held to the 
same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Sbiitts 11. A h ,  141 Idaho 706, 709, 
117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (quoting Twin Falls County 1). Coafes, 139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d 
1043,1046 (2003)). Moreover, "Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration 
simply because they are representing the~nseives and are not excused from adhering to procedural 
rules." Nelson 1) Nelson, 144 Idaho 71 8, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007) (citing Sanzmis v. Magnetelc, 
Iiaac 130 Idalio 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997)). 
The record is also cleav that the discovery requested by the Thomasons had been 
col~lplied with. The Thomasons have not sought any further discovely in the case. It is reasoilable 
to infer that the .Themasons did not seek further discovery becauseof the ten year history the 
' ,  
Thomasons have litigating the issues they want to continue to press in this case. Evidence of this 
is found in the hundreds of pages of documents the Thomasons have illeluded with their notices 
of appeal and their motions for reconsideration in this case. 
h any event, IRCP, Rule 56(Q provides: "Sl-~ould it appear from affidavits of a party 
opposing the inotioli that the paity can~~ot  for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify the paity's opposition, the court may . . . order a conti~zuailce to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taliell or discovery to be had. . ." The Thoinasoils did not avail 
thenlselves of this procedure, and it is reasonable to conclude that they did not: do so because they 
already had all the discovery they thought they needed. Regardless, they did not adhere to the 
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lules of civil procedure, and they should not be allowed to claim the district court abused its 
discretion when they had the opportunity to raise those issues with the district court and failed to 
do so. 
As the district court observed in its Order of October 20,2008 denying Thomasons' 
motion for reconsideration, a new trialhearing and other relief from the pa~tial suinmary 
judgnte~lent, "[TJhe Tholnasons made ito effort-from July 1 I to August I S  to reply to Plaintiff's 
summary judgment motion. As of today, defendants have yet to address the underlying merits of 
the claims." R. Vol. 4., p. 667. Motions for su~nmary judgnent are decided on facts shown, not 
on facts that might have been shown. Veipbillis li Depeizdable Appliance Co.. 107 Idaho 335, 
337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting partial summary judgment on the record before it. 
' 6 .  Matters listed as issues in the Th6rnasons' briefwhicl:, were not argued bv citation to 
facts in the record or by citation to s u ~ ~ o r t i n g  le al authority should be dee~ned abandoned. 
The Thornasons have listed as issues that the district court abused its discretion when it 
appointed referees, when it granted Madison Real Property its attorneys fees based on a s m n a r y  
judgment in violation of the appellants constitutiollal rights, and based on the appellants filed a 
nlotioll for a continua~~ce based on the fraudulent aagreenle~~t by [Madison Real Property's] 
counsel that he would have the hearing continued, and appellants being triclced into relying on his 
statement, thus denying the Thomasons due process. The Thomasons did not cite any facts in the 
record or supporting law for these issues. In the case of the allegation that counsel agreed to 
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continue the sununary judgment hearing, the record directly colltradicts the representations of the 
Tliomasons in their brief. " 
The Supreme Court also held that issues on appeal that are not suppofled by propositiolis 
of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered. flflleeler ii Idaho Dept. of 
Health & ?%!fare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009); I.A.R. 35(a)(6). "Because [the appellant] 
failed entirely to support her argument wit11 citations to any evidence in the record or relevant 
legal authority, this Court declined to review the argument." Michalk, at pp. 4-5. The issues 
raised by the Thomasons are not supported by citations to legal autholity or facts in the record 
should not be reviewed by this court. 
7. The district court did not err bv awarding Madison Real Propem1 attornev fees when 
the Thornasons did not object to the award. 
The Thomasons clalm for the first time in this appeal that the district court should not 
have awarded attorney fees to Madison Real Property for prevailing on its motion for partial 
summary judgment. Appellants' Joint Brief, pp. 39-40. Without any citation to the record, they 
claim that the district court laclted jurisdiction, Madison Real Property and its counsel had 
u~~clean hands, and did not prevail on its motio~~. Again, the Tl~omasons did not raise these issues 
wit11 the district court. IRCP 54(d)(6) provides that any paty may object to the claimed costs of 
another party set ibltll in a memo ran dun^ of costs by filing and serving on advase parties a 
I I hl a letter to tile Thomasoas dated July 3 1, 2008, counsel stated, "After some 
consideration, 1. have elected not to rescl~edule the hearing scheduled for August 18, 2008. . ." 
This letter was written in response to letters from the Thomasoi~s. R. Vol. 2., p. 241. 
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nlotion to disallow a11 or part of such costs within fourteen (14) days of service of the 
memorandum of cost. . . Failure to object to the items in the memorandun of costs shall 
constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed." The appellate courts in Idaho have 
held consistently with this rule in several cases. Corzner 1,. Dralce, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 11 73 
(1 982); Lower71 7). Board of Courzp Conznzissiorze~s, 115 Idaho 64,764 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court should not review the Thon~asons' attorney fees issue where they did not object to the 
award in a timely fashion ill district court as required by IRCP 54(d)(6) to preserve the issue for 
appeal. 
8. The district couli did not abuse its discreti011 when it denied Bwon and M a r i l m  
Thomasons' motion for a continuance of the hearing oil Madison Real Prooertv's motion for 
partial summaw iudmnent. 
The Thomasons also argue that the d~strict court abused its discretion by not grant~ilg 
Byron and Marilynn Thomasons' motion for a continuance. I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that "the 
court . . . for good cause shown . . . may continue the hearing [on a motion for surnniary 
judg~ne~it]. [The] standard for review of discretion for abuse requires a three-pronged inquiry to 
determine whetl~er the district court (1) conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the sl~eciiic l~oices before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason 
Lea~~itlil. S~lairz, 133 Idaho 624, 63 1, 991 P.2d 349, 356 (1 999); Sun I/nlle,y Shopping Ctr., Inc. 
11. Idalzo P o ~ l e ~  Co., 11 9 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1 991). Absent a clear showing of 
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abuse, a district court's exercise of discretion will not be overtu~lled. Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 
133, 135,15 P.3d 1141,1143 (2000). 
The record reflects that Byron and M a r i l p  Tllomason did not file any objection, brief, 
affidavit, deposition or other evidence in opposition to Madison Real Property's motion for 
partial sumnlat-y judgment before or since the date of the hearing. The motion for a co~ltinuance 
was filed the Friday before the Monday the hearing was to be held on. That Madison Real 
Property's attorney did not agee to continue the hearing and opposed it. That none of the 
Thornasons (including Nicholas and Sandra Thomason who did not move for a conti~luance) 
appeared at the hearing. Based upon the record the district court found that the Thomasons had 
not established good cause to grant a continuance, and therefore de~lied their motion. 
The district court denied the motion, recognizing its discretion to do so under the 
permissive language of Rule 56(c). The distict court acted within its legal boundaries as the facts 
did not support that there was good cause for a continuance. The district court reached its 
decision after hearing Madison Real Property's counsel's objection to the conti~~uance and after 
considering the facts before it. There has been no "clear showing of an abuse of discretion," 
therefore the Court should affirm the district court's ruling in tlle conti~ruance, 
V .  Conclusion 
Wit11 regards to their co~~lp la i~~ts  of lack of jurisdiction, and fraud, baliauptcy fraud, 
fiaud upon the court and fraudulei~t ransfer, the Tl~on~asons invite t l~e Court of Appeals to 
engage in a far reaching exploration of ten years of litigation by the Thomaso~ls wit11 wl~icl~ they 
are not satisfied. Wit11 regards to their co~nplaint hat Madison Real Propeity did not have 
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standing, they are attenlpting to use doculne~lts illat were not before the district courl and not to 
be found in tlle record, to reverse the holding of tile district court. The othe~ issues raised by the 
Thomasons in this appeal were not raised in the district court as required by tlie law and rules, 
and were not preserved for appeal. The Thoinasoils have disregarded the facts it1 the record, the 
law, and the rules of civil procedure in axil. brief. 
Tl~is appeal is not suppo~ted by t l~e facts or tile law. The Court should deny the 
Thomasons' appeal and affirm the judgment and orders ofthe district court made to date. 
Madison Real Property should be awarded its attorney fees and costs for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 231d day of December, 2009. 
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